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Where Do the Prophets Stand? Hamdi, Myth, and
the Master's Tools
LINDA H. EDWARDST

I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine an ancient walled city. Inside the walls, the city's inhabitants
busily go about their work. They have routines. They have a common
language. They do not always agree with each other, but they meet in
common places and use accepted methods and procedures to decide the
city's issues. Outside the wall stands a small group of prophets. The
prophets have messages for the city's people, and they are trying to be
heard over the city's walls. Occasionally a few city dwellers become
aware that someone is shouting from outside the walls, but the words fall
strangely on city dwellers' ears. The distant voices, barely audible, are lost
among the background sounds of ongoing city life. Occasionally, a city
leader looks over the walls, notices the prophets, and lobs a verbal assault
in their direction, but city life is unaffected. Year after year, the prophets
speak, and year after year, the city ignores them.
Does this image of the ancient walled city and the prophets excluded
from it describe the relationship of oppositionists with law? Have people
like Patricia Williams, Robin West, Kimberle Crenshaw, Richard Delgado,
Mai Matsuda, and the late Derrick Bell been standing outside the gates for
over thirty years, critiquing the city of law and the work of its inhabitants?
Many traditionalist' leaders seem to think so. Inside the city, they have
been going about their work unaffected,2 using the same language and
methods they learned from their mentors. Occasionally a traditionalist
defender reacts to the prophets, usually with name-calling derision.
Consider this from Richard Posner:

I

E.L. Cord Foundation Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada
Las Vegas. I would like to thank Jan Bartrum, Linda Berger, Ken Chestek, Dan Edwards, Teresa
Godwin Phelps, David Ritchie, Elaine Shoben, and Jeff Stempel for their thoughtful comments on
earlier drafts. As always, many thanks to Matthew Wright for his invaluable research assistance. This
article is dedicated to James Boyd White in gratitude for teaching us how to live a good life in the law.
' For purposes of this article, "traditionalist" refers to those committed wholeheartedly and
perhaps exclusively to traditional methods of legal analysis described. See Nancy Levit, Critical of
Race Theory: Race Reason, Merit, and Civility, 87 GEO. L.J. 795 (1999).
2 Larry Cata Backer authored a ten year study of judicial citation rates for oppositionist

scholarship. According to the study, what stands out most is the silence. "The most striking general
pattern that emerges from this study of citations is the lack of any significant engagement with the work
of outsider scholars." Larry Cata Backer, Measuring the Penetration of Outsider Scholarship into the
Court: Indifference, Hostility,Engagement, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1173, 1182, 1210 (2000).
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What is most arresting about critical race theory is that ...
it turns its back on the Western tradition of rational
inquiry, forswearing analysis for narrative. Rather than
marshal logical arguments and empirical data, critical race
theorists tell stories - fictional, science-fictional,
autobiographical, anecdotal
designed to expose the
pervasive and debilitating racism of America today. By
repudiating reasoned argumentation, the storytellers
reinforce stereotypes about the intellectual capacities of
nonwhites.'

Posner goes on, using terms like "lunatic core," "postmodernist virus,"
"loony Afrocentrism," and "goofy ideas and irresponsible dicta." 4 He calls
critical race theorists "whiners and wolf-criers," coming across as "labile
and intellectually limited."' He says, "Their grasp of social reality is weak;
their diagnoses are inaccurate; their suggested cures .

.

. are tried and true

failures. Their lodgment in the law schools is a disgrace to legal education,
which lacks the moral courage and the intellectual self-confidence to
pronounce a minority movement's scholarship bunk." 6 Having hurled his
attack over the city walls, he goes back to his own work, unaffected by
oppositionist critique.
Posner and other traditionalists thus maintain that oppositionists stand
outside the gates of law. If they are on law faculties, they should not be.
Whether this view is accurate depends, in large part, on what we mean by
law. Some of history's best scholars and judges have been tramping
around in that field for a long time, so one might wonder how much
ground remains untrod. Still, we need to find some new territory, because
we are far from a satisfactory answer. What's worse is that we do not
seem able to have a productive conversation, as Posner demonstrates. The
loudest traditionalist voices ridicule both critical theory's narrative
methods," and critical theorists themselves. 9 To the traditionalist eye,
critical theorists repudiate traditional legal discourse as nothing more than
domination and power politics.'o It is as if the two camps are speaking
Richard A. Posner, The Skin Trade, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 13, 1997, at 40-43. Although not
typical, some oppositionists choose narrative methodology. See, e.g., Levit, supra note 1, at 811-13.
4 Posner, supra note 3, at 40-43.
' Id. at 43.
6 Id.

See Paul D. Carrington, OfLaw and the River, 34 J.LEGAL EDUC. 222, 227 (1984) (describing
critical theorists as preaching "antilaw" and arguing that they should leave the legal academy).
See Backer, supra note 2, at 1209-10 (stating that oppositionist scholarship is diverse and
certainly not limited to storytelling, but debates about methodology tend to be the most difficult; thus,
this article focuses on the debate about narrative).
9 Id. at 1210.
1o Posner, supra note 3, at 42.
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different languages. In fact, in some important ways, they are.
The twenty-fifth anniversary of the publication of Peter Goodrich's
Legal Discourse: Studies in Linguistics, Rhetoric and Legal Analysis"
offers an appropriate opportunity to revisit this topic. This article's modest
goal is to suggest that narrative theory and cognitive science 2 can help
traditionalists better understand the language of critical theory 3
specifically, why critical theory insists on telling stories and why those
narrative cnitiques are legitimately a part of law.' 4 Since the article's
primary goal is to speak to traditionalists, it begins by using what Posner
wants-logical argument-to "reason" its way to the conclusion that
critical theory critiques law from the inside. A key part of that deductive
argument is the premise that cultural myths and other master stories
operate at a largely hidden and unconscious level beneath the language of
traditional law talk. To explain and demonstrate that premise, the article
offers a short course in myth and then looks at the role of one myth-the
myth of redemptive violence-in legal decision-making. The article
explains the myth and how it is pervasively reinforced through movies,
video games, and other media and then shows how it affected the
deliberations in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the saga of an American citizen
imprisoned without due process by his own government.1
Deductive argument cannot be the end of the matter, however, because
naive reliance on "reason" is actually the antithesis of this article's primary
point and certainly inconsistent with critical theory itself What we mean
by "law" is not a matter of some seemingly preordained logical structurePETER GOODRICH, LEGAL DISCOURSE:

STUDIES IN LINGUISTICS, RHETORIC AND LEGAL

ANALYSIS (1987).

12 These two areas are examples of the kinds of rhetorical studies that can offer "a place to stand"
between critical theory and formalism, and perhaps also a deeper theoretical explanation for legal
realism. Linda L. Berger, Studying and Teaching "Law as Rhetoric": A Place to Stand, 16 J. LEGAL

WRITING INST. 3 (2010). More relevant for the purposes of this article, rhetorical analysis, positioned
as it is between critical theory and more traditional legal discourse, can help traditionalists better
understand the narrative methods of oppositionists. That understanding is a critical first step toward a
civil and perhaps even productive conversation.
" I speak from the ranks of neither critical theorists nor traditionalists but rather as a rhetorician
with oppositionist sympathies. As Nancy Levit wisely observed, it is dangerous to try to speak on
behalf of another's perspective. Levit, supra note 1, at 795 ("A hazard lurks in any but the most careful
representation of another's viewpoint. Call it 'slippage' perhaps, or the 'essentialist error,' the point is
basically the same: communication rarely does complete justice to its object."). I fear that I am in
double-danger here, because my goal is to help one group of which I am not a member better
understand another group of which I am also not a member. I hope readers from both groups will
forgive the necessary lack of nuance here and there, understanding that my goal is not to fully describe
all the many diversities in either group but rather to provide a starting point for better understanding
between them.
14 It is another question entirely to ask whether oppositionists are willing to come inside the city
walls or whether, fearing assimilation, they would prefer to remain outsiders. See generally Sylvia R.
Lazos Vargas, "Kulturkampf(s) " or "Fit(s)of Spite? ": Taking the Academic Culture Wards Seriously,

35 SETONHALL L. REV. 1309, 1345-48 (2005).
15See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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this one or any other. Rather, it is a matter of human choice, and as with
all matters of human choice, it is driven by contested values, frames,
power, and politics. This article, therefore, offers some non-deductive
reasons for choosing to define "law" broadly enough to include critical
theory's critiques. First, though, a deductive argument:
II. DEFINING "LAW" DEDUCTIVELY: A FOUR-STEP DANCE

A. Step One: Law includes legal outcomes and the articulated
reasonsfor those outcomes.
To start simply, law includes constitutions, statutes, regulations, and
judicial decisions. Traditional law talk interprets and applies these texts
using a cadre of traditional methods:
semantic interpretation of
authoritative text; reliance on canons of statutory construction; the use of
careful or creative analogies; and the support of relevant social policy,
economic theory, or moral principle.16 These methods have long been
treated as legitimately part of "law" because they claim to account for legal
results, shaping how the law is applied and how it may change. When
lawyers and judges use these methods, no one would dispute that they are
using the methods of the law. When Richard Posner finishes his tirade
against critical race theory and returns to his normal daily work, these are
his tools. 17

B. Step Two: These tools are the stated reasonsfor legal decisions,
but they do notfully orfundamentally accountfor legal outcomes.
As both oppositionists and rhetoricians have pointed out, legal results
are not simply the result of adherence to authority or policy.' Rather, they
are the product of underlying values and assumptions about human nature
16See WILSON HUHN, THE FIVE TYPES OF LEGAL ARGUMENT (2d ed. 2008).
" Since these articulated reasons are the tools of traditional legal analysis, one can see why, to an

oppositionist, they seem like the "master's tools." The "master's tools" metaphor was introduced by
oppositionist poet Audre Lorde in The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House.
Audre Lorde, The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House, in SISTER OUTSIDER 112

(Nancy K. Bereano ed., The Crossing Press 2000) (1984). Lorde argued that feminism suffered from
unrecognized dependence on the patriarchy, therefore passing on the very oppression it sought to
overcome. She wrote, "[T]he master's tools will never dismantle the master's house. They may allow
us temporarily to beat him at his own game, but they will never enable us to bring about genuine
change." Id. Lorde's metaphor has become part of critical legal discourse, particularly in discussions
of essentialism and intersectionality. See, e.g., Trina Grillo, Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality:
Tools to Dismantle the Master's House, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 17 (1995); Zanita E. Fenton, The
Paradox of Hierarchy- Or Why We Always Choose the Tools of the Master's House, 31 N.Y.U. REV.

OF LAW & Soc. CHANGE 627 (2007) (and also as part of the explanation of critical theory's supposed
juxtaposition of story against traditional legal analysis).
' E.g., Mari Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: CriticalLegal Studies and Reparation, 22 HARV.

C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987); GOODRICH, supra note 11, at 209.
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and the world, what Peter Goodrich calls "preconstructions, preferred
meanings, rhetorical and ideological dimensions." 19 Among these
preconstructions are the cultural myths, 20 metaphors, and meta-narratives
that frame the way those in power see the world. Far more effectively than
authorities or policies, these implicit but largely unrecognized21 frames
(values, assumptions, social and political structures) account for where we
are and how we got here. 22 Thus, myths and other frames operate silently
but powerfully beneath traditional law talk about objective reasons.

C. Step Three: If culturalmyths and other preconstructionsguide
and constrain legal decisions (step two), then surely these
preconstructionsare alsopart of law.
It would be a curious position to say that law includes the reasons that
claim-perhaps inaccurately-to account for legal results but not the
actual, though unstated, reasons for those same legal results.23 Powerful
forces cultivate these preconstructions and are simultaneously captured by
them, as will be discussed below. Their problematic operation is or should

19GOODRICH, supra note 11, at 204.
20 A myth is a traditional story of ostensibly historical events that serves to unfold part of the
world view of a people or explain a practice, belief, or natural phenomenon. Webster's Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary 785 (1987). Often it is a story about a hero or a powerful being, which may or
may not have a historical basis in fact. The term "myth" in its technical sense, which is how it is used
here, implies nothing about historical truth or falsity. Myth is certainly not the only preconstruction
operating in law, but for the purposes of this discussion, it will be quite enough.
21 Law "appropriates the meaning of other discourses and of social relations themselves, while
specifically denying that it is doing so. It is, in short, politically necessary to take seriously the
character of law as a social discourse." GOODRICH, supra note 11, at 204.

22 See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Storytellingfor Oppositionistsand Others:A Pleafor Narrative, 87

MICH. L. REv. 2411, 2413 (1989).
[M]indset [is] the bundle of presuppositions, received wisdoms, and shared
understandings against a background of which legal and political discourse takes
place. These matters are rarely focused on. They are like eyeglasses we have
worn a long time. They are nearly invisible; we use them to scan and interpret
the world and only rarely examine them for themselves."). Audre Lorde surely
would agree. She wrote, "Somewhere on the edge of consciousness, there is
what I call a mythical norm . . . In America, this norm is usually defined as

white, thin, male, young, heterosexual, Christian, and financially secure. It is
with this mythical norm that the trappings of power reside within this society."
Lorde, supra note 17, at 112.
2 GOODRICH, supra note 11, at
159.

[L]aw is a social practice formally tied to particular institutions or apparatuses
and primarily, though by no means exclusively, defined by its use of particular
types of discourse. . . . [T]he refusal to allow any intrinsic or essentialist
definition of law opens the way to a view of law as a process or set of processes,
and consequently also, as a discourse which is inevitably answerable or
responsible . . . for its place and role within the ethical, political, and sexual
commitments of its times. Id.

48

CONNECTICUT PUBLIC INTERESTL4 WJOURNAL

[Vol. 13:1

be a target of oppositionist critique of law.24 Dominant myths and other
such frames have been instrumental in building and maintaining the
master's house and are among the master's most important tools. 25
Therefore, logically, they are part of "law," just as the unseen foundation is
part of a house.

D. Step Four: If myths and other stories arepart of law when used
implicitly by the masters in making law (step three), they are
surely part of law when used explicitly by those who critique law.
Quite rightly, early oppositional critique used those same toolsespecially stories-to challenge the way the world looks to those
inhabiting the halls of power.2 6 The turn to narrative was part of the early
brilliance of critical theory, made at a time when few others had realized
the significance of narrative in law. Are these myths, metaphors, and
outsider stories part of law? If narrative is part of law when it is used by
the dominant group to justify particular legal results (step three), it is
surely also part of law when used by critical theory to critique those same
results. It would seem, then, that Goodrich is right.27 Oppositional critique
is within law, not external to it.
The key difference between traditional law-talk and oppositionist
critique is that those controlling myths, metaphors, and meta-narratives are
kept implicit in traditional law-talk. We don't speak of those things. We
confine the discourse to rationalist, scientific, putatively objective
language. As oppositionists and rhetoricians have pointed out, it is in the
interests of those in power to limit law to this "self-protective" view. But
to oppositionists and at least some rhetoricians, such traditional law talk is
24

Mari Matsuda has observed that critical theory considers law to be a process of legitimizing

what might otherwise seem illegitimate. Mari Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies

andReparations,22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 329 n.27 (1987). Neither an announced legal result
nor traditional legal analysis can legitimate an outcome inconsistent with a widely-adopted cultural
metaphor or story. Witness, for instance, the public outcry against the Supreme Court's ruling in Kelo
v. City ofNew London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), the notorious eminent domain case that sparked a national
furor to protect private property rights. If Matsuda is right, then law must include cultural myths and
metaphors, for only such cultural frames can legitimate a legal outcome.
25

Linda H. Edwards, Once Upon a Time in Law: Myth, Metaphor, andAuthority, 77 TENN. L.

REV. 883, 885 (2010).
26 See, e.g., Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court, 1984 Term - Foreward: The Civil Rights
Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1985); Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of
Consent in the Moral andPolitical Visions of Franz Kafka andRichardPosner,99 HARV. L. REV. 385
(1985); Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: ReconstructingIdeals from Deconstructed Rights, 22

HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401 (1987).
2 GOODRICH, supra note 11, at 7-8. "I have been concerned ... to challenge, from within the
legal discipline itself, the manner in which the legal text is constructed or produced . . . so as to
recapture an essentially social discourse from the interstices of a discipline that has all too easily and
frequently defined itself by means of a near total social amnesia." Id. "[T]he dominant paradigm of
legal language and legal text cannot account for the semantic content of the legal text as judgment or
linguistic practice - the diversity of meanings and usages which are actually realised." Id. at 205-06.
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only an attempt to justify a result chosen for other and often unstated
reasons. 28 i a way comparable to a psychoanalyst looking for what lies
beneath an explicit behavior, oppositionists try to look deeper to ask what
is really going on. Is that permissible in the discourse community? Can
such things be said inside the wall? Law is clearly, even in the most
traditionalist view, the product of argument. I will contend here that
justificatory argument in rationalist objectivist language is half of an
argument with oppositionist critique constituting the other half. For law to
progress, for it to live in dynamic tension, we need both sides of the
argument inside the wall. The rationalists are free to deny and refute
oppositionist critique, but not to silence or exile it.
Like any deductive argument, this little four-step dance is subject to
challenge at several key points. It might be vulnerable in step two, for
instance, in the face of skepticism about admitting a legal role for the
myths and other frames that support the power of the dominant group. It is
certainly vulnerable in step three, for one could fairly say that once we
include in "law" the largely unconscious cultural frames that operate
within us, then law includes everything and the question loses its meaning.
Perhaps these more foundational but unconscious myths and other frames
are not part of law because their effects are ubiquitous, defining, and
constraining our views of the world in every part of life. One might argue,
then, that oppositionist critique both originates from outside law and
critiques something other than law.29 With these two legitimate challenges
on the table, it is fair to require me to say more about the legal role of
myths and other frames and about what is at stake when we choose a
definition for law.
III. A SHORT COURSE IN MYTH AND OTHER MASTER STORIES
Years ago, Robert Cover began to teach us the world-creating role of
narrative in law. He wrote:
We inhabit a nomos - a normative universe. We
constantly create and maintain a world of right and wrong,
of lawful and unlawful, of valid and void.

. .

. No set of

legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the
narratives that locate it and give it meaning. For every

2

Id. at 204.
step four can be challenged. Perhaps one could identify some salient distinction, though I
am not sure what, between preconceptions that prevail in deciding a legal question and those that do
not.
29 Even
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constitution there is an epic, for each decalogue a
scripture.30
At the time, little cognitive work had been done to understand how this
normative universe works, but such is not the case today. As Steven
Winter writes:
There is a virtual revolution going on within the cognitive
sciences. Basic-level categorization, radial categories,
image-schemas, conceptual metaphor - these and other
findings are transforming our fundamental understanding
of the mind.

.

. By far the most important conclusions to

emerge from this recent work on cognition are two: first,
that imagination is central to the cognitive process; and,
second, that imagination is embodied... On the one hand,
we are discovering that human thought is irreducibly
imaginative. On the other, we are learning that - contrary
to the conventional wisdom - human imagination operates
in an orderly and systematic fashion. This insight alters
the contours of entire debates in disciplines such as law ...
The promise of cognitive theory lies precisely in its ability
to make explicit the unconscious criteria and cognitive
operations that structure and constitute our judgment. It is
by laying bare these cognitive structures and their impact
on our reasoning that we can best aid legal actors whether advocates or decision-makers - who wish to
understand the law better so that they can act more
effectively. 31
The unconscious operations Winter describes take the form of
cognitive structures known as schemas-preexisting mental patterns and
images that provide interpretive frameworks through which people
perceive the world and make judgments about it.32 A schema functions as
a blueprint that organizes people, places, and events into roles made
o Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term - Foreword:Nomos andNarrative, 97 HARV.

L. REV. 4, 4 (1983).
" STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND xi-xvii (2001).
2 The term "schema" can have different meanings in different disciplines. Here, the term is used
in its rhetorical sense as an embedded knowledge structure rather than, for instance, as an "expert"
schema referring to a heuristic or framework used as a shortcut by experts in a specific field. Richard
K. Sherwin, The Narrative Construction of Legal Reality, 18 VT. L. REV. 681, 717 (1994); see
generally, Linda L. Berger, How Embedded Knowledge StructuresAffect Judicial Decision Making: A
Rhetorical Analysis of Metaphor, Narrative, and Imagination in Child Custody Disputes, 18 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 259 (2009).
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familiar by that particular schema.33 The resulting cognitive organizations
and perceptions seem to the individual as the natural and "true" state of
affairs. Once within the frame of such a cognitive structure, escape is
difficult. The operative schema both highlights and hides information.3 4 It
highlights information that seems consistent with the schema's pattern, and
it hides inconsistent information. Thus, the structure reinforces the societal
or cultural values encoded within it.
Cultural myths and other master stories are among the most pervasive
of these unconscious schemas.3 5 Human beings are hard-wired to organize
the world narratively, with abstract reasoning and deductive processes only
arising derivatively from the preexisting narrative structure .36 Myths and
master stories operate widely within cultures to mediate new events and
infuse them with shared social meaning.3 7 These cultural myths function
as templates to channel other potentially similar events into a well-worn
path. 38 The outcome suggested by the myth or master story will seem both
true and inevitable.3 9
These cognitive operations should come as no surprise to critical
theorists, who have observed schemas in action for years. Consider, for
instance, Richard Delgado's well-known description of six competing
stories of a hypothetical but painfully familiar law school hiring process.40
What may be less well-known, however, is the startling cognitive finding
that a schema's world-creating work precedes conscious perception, so that
it simply may not be biologically possible to perceive new facts free of the
unconscious operation of a schema. Here is a description of research done
by University of Texas neurobiologist Dr. David Engleman:
Engleman's research has shown that the brain lives just a
little bit in the past. A human brain collects a lot of
information and then pauses for a moment to organize it
before releasing the processed information to the
Berger,supra note 32, at 265.
34See, e.g., WINTER, supra note 31.
Berger, supranote 32, at 268; Judith Olans Brown et al., The Mythogenesis of Gender:Judicial
Images of Women in Paid and UnpaidLabor,6 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 457, 457-58 (1996).
36JEROME BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING 45 (1990); ROBERT P. BuRNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL

159 (1999); Berger, supra note 32, at 268; Brown et al., supra note 35, at 457-58; Christopher Rideout,
Storytelling,NarrativeRationality,and Legal Persuasion,14 J. LEGAL WRITING 54, 57-59 (2008).
3 See generally Edwards, supra note 25; see also Jennifer Sheppard, Once Upon a Time, Happily
Ever After, and in a Galaxy Far, Far Away: Using Narrative to Fill the Cognitive Gap Left by
Overrelianceon PureLogic in Appellate Briefs andMotion Memoranda, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 255,
259-63 (2010).

3 WINTER, supra note 31, at 106-13; Berger, supra note 32, at 268; Steven L. Winter, Making the
Familiar ConventionalAgain, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1607, 1629 (2001).
39 Berger, supra note 32, at 265; e.g., David F. Chavkin, Fuzzy Thinking: A BorrowedParadigm
for CrisperLawyering, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 163 (1997).
40

Delgado, supra note 22, at 2418-34.
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conscious mind. "Now" actually happened a little while
(several milliseconds) ago. . . . To demonstrate this for

yourself, tap your finger on a tabletop at arm's length.
Light travels faster than sound. So the sight actually
reached you a few milliseconds before the sounds.
However, your brain synchronized the two to make them
seem simultaneous. The same thing happens when you
watch someone's lips move as they speak. During these
microsecond pauses the brain/mind constructs a plausible
story to make the incoming information make sense.
Sensory impressions enter the brain; stories exit to the
conscious mind for interpretation and action. A significant
part of what the brain does for the conscious mind is
structure experience into story. 41
In other words, from before the first moment of becoming aware of an
event, we have already assumed a perspective, most likely by fitting the
facts into a familiar narrative pattern. The question is not whether we see
the world through the lens of a story, but which story lens we will use.
Nearly twenty-four years ago, Delgado referred to "a war between
stones."42 Modern cognitive science has proven the truth of that
observation. 43 If a lawyer, judge, or law student does not realize that there
is more than one "true" story, that lawyer, judge, or student will remain
unconsciously captive to a set of unexamined assumptions based on
narratives. In the practice of law, the lawyer's job is to provide the judge
and other legal actors the chance to examine those assumptions. Harvard
Law School Dean Martha Minow wrote:
Modes of analysis and argument that maintain their
exclusive hold on the truth are suspect. By casting doubt
4' KENDALL HAVEN, STORY PROOF: THE SCIENCE BEHIND THE STARLING POWER OF STORY 22
(2007).
42 Delgado, supra note 22,
at 2418.
43 See, e.g., ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW (2002); THE
PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan Bandes ed., 1999); JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & JEAN R. STERNLIGHT,
PSYCHOLOGY FOR LAW (2012); Peter H. Huang & Christopher J. Anderson, A Psychology of
Emotional Legal Decision Making: Revulsion and Saving Face in Legal Theory and Practice, 90
MINN. L. REV. 1045 (2006); Lucille A. Jewel, Through a Glass Darkly: Using Brain Science and
Visual Rhetoric to Gain a Professional Perspective on Visual Advocacy, 19 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
237 (2010); Mark L. Johnson, Mind, Metaphor, Law, 58 MERCER L. REV. 845 (2007); Laura E. Little,
Negotiating the Tangle ofLaw and Emotion, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 974 (2001); Terry A. Maroney, The
Persistent Cultural Script ofJudicial Dispassion,99 CALIF. L. REV. 629 (2011); Kathryn M. Stanchi,
Playing With Fire: The Science of ConfrontingAdverse Materialin Legal Advocacy, 60 RUTGERS L.
REV. 381 (2008); Kathryn Stanchi, The Power of Priming in Legal Advocacy: Using the Science of
First Impressions to Persuadethe Reader, 89 OR. L. REV. 305 (2010); Symposium, Law, Psychology,
and the Emotions, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1423 (2000); WINTER, supranote 31.
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on alternative modes, they shield themselves from
challenge and suppress alternative ways of understanding.
They also render ordinary and explicable all they
encounter: "To a hammer, everything looks like a nail."
But some things are extraordinary and call for
extraordinary responses. Methods of analysis that smooth
out the bumps and subsume all under generalizations risk
not only making this mistake but hiding it from view. 44
Attempting to counteract the world-creating influence of a dominant
cultural myth has never been easy, but in recent years, the challenge for
oppositionists has become much more difficult. During the era of the
Warren Court, many widespread cultural narratives were progressive narratives of fairness, individual equality, and social liberty. The effects of
these progressive narratives were not lost on the strategists of the Right,
however. Today, whether by a carefully crafted plan45 or by a convergence
of other forces, many master narratives or world-creating myths support
and maintain the forces of domination. 6 The myth of redemptive violence
is one such master narrative.
III. THE MYTH OF REDEMPTIVE VIOLENCE
The myth of redemptive violence appeared at least as early as a story
told in the Enuma Elish, an ancient Babylonian cosmogony from about
1250 B.C.E. According to the story, before the world was created, Apsu,
the father god, and Tiamat, the mother god, were the only living beings.48
Then Tiamat gave birth to younger gods, but these younger gods were loud
and irritating, so Apsu decided to kill them. 4 9 The younger gods, having
discovered the plot, managed to kill Apsu before he could kill them. 0
Tiamat - who was also called the Dragon of Chaos - became enraged and
vowed revenge.5 She assembled her forces and prepared for battle. She

4 MARTHA MINOW, Stories in Law, in LAW'S STORIES 35 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz, eds.,

1996).
45 GEORGE LAKOFF, DON'T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT!: KNOW YOUR VALUES AND FRAME THE
DEBATE (2004).
4 This is not to say that progressive narratives do not operate today or that more troublesome
narratives did not operate in prior years. Rather, it is a matter of cultural emphasis and both intentional
and unintentional partisan use.
47 A cosmogony is a story about the creation of the universe. Webster's Ninth New Collegiate
Dictionary, 294 (1987).
48 MYTHS FROM MESOPOTAMIA:

(Stephanie Dalley, ed. and trans., 1989).
49

1Id.

50

at 234.
Id. at 235.

51Id.

at 237.
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created other dragons, poisonous snakes, and terrible weapons.52 The
younger gods were terrified, helpless against Tiamat's impending attack.53
In the face of all this fear, the other gods pleaded with one of their
number, Marduk, to fight Tiamat. Marduk agreed, but on one condition:
the other gods must give Marduk unquestioned obedience." The other
gods agreed, 6 so Marduk devised a plan. First, he caught Tiamat in a net.
Of course the mighty Tiamat could easily tear her way free, but Marduk
knew that the net would make her angry. When she opened her mouth to
roar in anger, Marduk drove a mighty wind down her throat. Then he shot
an arrow into her distended belly, exploding it and piercing her heart. 7
Marduk split open Tiamat's skull and scattered her blood across the
firmament. Then he stretched out her corpse full-length and from it, he
created the earth.'
The younger gods and all the rest of creation gave homage to Marduk
and remained true to the bargain.59 Their responsibility was to obey
Marduk.o In exchange, Marduk would protect them from all future
Dragons of Chaos. According to this creation myth, human beings have
only two options: to unquestioningly obey their leader or be destroyed by
the evil forces of chaos.
Myths are powerfful teachers, and this one teaches a particular set of
lessons. It teaches that in its natural state, the world is in the power of
overwhelmingly destructive evil forces. At any moment, these forces may
attack and people are powerless to protect themselves. The only hope is a
strong leader, who will save vulnerable mortals by defeating the powers
that threaten them, thus imposing order and safety. The price, however, is
unquestioning obedience to the leader.
The story of the Enuma Elish, in various forms, spread throughout
ancient Assyria, Phoenicia, Egypt, Greece, Rome, Germany, Ireland, India,
and China. Its basic structure and theme remained a part of succeeding
cultures. The story is over 3,250 years old now, but its characteristics
should still sound familiar. In the last forty years, our culture has been
saturated with retellings of what Walter Wink has called "the myth of
redemptive violence."
Consider nearly any action movie starring Bruce
52Id.

Id. at 242.
54 MYTHS FROM MESOPOTAMIA: CREATION, THE FLOOD, GILGAMESH, & OTHERS 237 (Stephanie

Dalley, ed. and trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1989).
5 Id. at 244.
5
6 Id. at 249.
Id. at 252.
5
1Id. at 255.
59
1Id. at 257-58.
60

MYTHS FROM MESOPOTAMIA: CREATION, THE FLOOD, GILGAMESH, & OTHERS 250 (Stephanie

Dalley, ed. and trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1989).
61 WALTER WINK, THE POWERS THAT BE: THEOLOGY FOR A NEW MILLENNIUM 42-62
(1998).
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Willis or Arnold Schwarzenegger.62 Almost all modem action movies and
many dramas are versions of this same mythical story.63
An easy example is the plot of the movie KINDERGARTEN Cop: 64
Detective John Kimble (Arnold Schwarzenegger) is pursuing Cullen Crisp,
a big-time drug dealer.65 Kimble arrests Crisp for murder, but Kimble's
police associates, using traditional police methods, are not able to convince
the only witness to testify. She believes the police are incapable of
protecting her. Frustrated with the "soft" persuasion techniques of his
police associates, Kimble uses threats and violence until the witness finally
agrees to testify. The police want a second witness, however, so Kimble
goes undercover to find Crisp's estranged wife, who has fled from their
marriage, taking their son. Crisp has been looking for her, planning to kill
her and retake the boy. Kimble hopes to find her first and threaten her
with both exposure to Crisp and criminal prosecution by police unless she
will testify. Kimble travels to Astoria, where the estranged wife is living,
and pretends to be a kindergarten teacher at the boy's school. Instead of
using normal pedagogical methods, he teaches his kindergarten students to
be junior police cadets, having them march to his whistle and obey his
commands. Soon, Kimble identifies Crisp's wife and son, who are living
681
under the names of Joyce and Dominic Palmieri.
Meanwhile, just as we were meant to expect, back in the city, the
62 Or consider the movie, GET SMART (Warner Bros. 2008), where Maxwell Smart and Agent
99
work for an agency named CONTROL and fight against an agency named KAOS.
6 A few examples of "hard action" movies using this plot are: the LETHAL WEAPON
(Warner
Bros. 1987) series, the TERMINATOR (Orion Pictures 1984) series, RANmO (Orion Pictures 1982), the
JACK RYAN (Paramount Pictures 1990) series, the X MEN (Twentieth Century Fox 2000) series,
COLLATERAL DAMAGE (Warner Bros. 2002), the MISSION IMPOSSIBLE (Paramount Pictures 1996)
series, most Steven Seagal movies, the KILL BILL (Miramax Films 2003) series, and AIR FORCE ONE
(Columbia Pictures 1997). Examples of lighter action movies (ample violence but some humor and
designed for broader audiences, including children) are INDEPENDENCE DAY (Twentieth Century Fox
1996), the BATMAN (Warner Bros. 1989) series, the SPIDERMAN (Columbia Picutres 2002) series, the
SUPERMAN (Warner Bros. 1978) series, the KARATE KID (Columbia Pictures 1984) series, ROBIN
HOOD (Universal Pictures 2010), the MATRIX (Warner Bros. 1999) series, KINDERGARTEN COP
(Univeral Pictures 1990), the MEN IN BLACK (Columbia Pictures 1997) series, the INDIANA JONES
(Paramount Pictures 1981) series, and TRuE LIES (Twentieth Century Fox 1994). This same plot
structure is present in other genre and media, as well, including westerns, monster and vampire movies,
science fiction or disaster movies, comedies, cartoons, and video games. The villain does not even
have to be a person. Consider the movie JAWS (Universal Pictures 1975), for example. Remember
how Tiamat is killed: A wind is forced down her throat and then Marduk shoots an arrow into her belly,
exploding her. In Jaws, the ocean (which, in myth, is often the source of chaos) is home to a shark
larger by a third than any known shark. The movie's preview describes the shark: "It is as if nature had
concentrated all its forces of evil in a single being." Ultimately, Police Chief Brody defeats the shark
by kicking an oxygen tank into the attacking shark's throat, then firing a bullet that explodes the tank,
thus exploding the shark. Brody is a hero, danger is subdued, and the people are restored to safety.
64
KINDERGARTEN COP (Universal Pictures 1990).
65 KINDERGARTEN COP, IMDB, http://perma.cc/GC3Y-JS4N (last visited Dec. 4,
2013).
66
6

id.
Id.

68Id.
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police, using their traditional methods, have failed to protect the other
witness. Crisp's mother, Eleanor Crisp, becomes a moving force in the
plot. Furious at her son's arrest, she kills the witness, and the prosecution
must therefore dismiss all charges. Crisp is freed, and Eleanor collects him
from jail. The pair immediately proceed to Astoria, intending to do
whatever is necessary to take the boy and dispose of his mother.69
Upon arriving in Astoria, Cullen finds and grabs his son. The
kindergarten class sees the grab, however, and they alert Kimble using his
police-cadet-style training. Kimble and his partner manage to kill Cullen,
capture Eleanor, and rescue Dominic. He and his mother are now safe.
Kimble retires from the police force and returns to Astoria, continuing to
teach his students to be "junior cadets." We are left to believe that
whenever danger threatens in the future, Kimble will be there to save the
day.
KINDERGARTEN COP is one of an almost limitless list of modem
versions of the myth of redemptive violence. Instead of Apsu, we have
Cullen, who is killed, thus enraging Eleanor, the female destructive force
(Tiamat). Kimble is the Marduk figure, the strong leader who can protect
the vulnerable targets of evil, but he must have complete obedience from
those he protects. The movie teaches the same lessons we identified in the
Enuma Elish: that at any moment, overwhelmingly destructive forces may
attack us. On our own, we cannot protect ourselves. Our only hope is
unquestioning obedience to a strong leader, who will save us by defeating
the evil powers that threaten us. But the myth teaches another highly
problematic lesson as well: it teaches that normative legal and social
systems are weak, misguided, ineffectively cumbersome, or completely
impotent in the face of serious threats. Thus, to be able to save us, the hero
must not be constrained by the "technicalities"7 0 of law. Efficient violence
is the only way to maintain order and control truly sinister evil.
Nearly all versions of the myth find narrative ways to demonstrate the
law's ineffectiveness. Usually, the story uses a combination of strategies
to drive its lesson home: casting the hero as a police officer whose style
and techniques have been rejected, either formally or informally, by his
police peers, as in KINDERGARTEN COP;71 describing cumbersome
investigative protocols that foil effective police work; 72 portraying other
officers or governmental officials as corrupt and in league with evil
69id.

'0 One could make a case that the myth of redemptive violence is almost solely responsible for the
phrase "got off on a technicality." Usually the technicality at issue is a Constitutional provision, but the
myth has taught well the lesson that constitutional rights are luxuries, to be followed only when nothing
really important is at stake.
71 See, e.g., the DIE HARD (Twentieth Century Fox 1988) series; EXIT WOUNDS (Warner Bros.
2001); all of the LETHAL WEAPON (Warner Bros. 1987) series.
2 See, e.g., COLLATERAL DAMAGE (Warner Bros. 2002).
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forces; or even creating a narrative world in which there seem to be no
relevant legal systems or standards at all.
Movies have a compelling narrative reason for portraying law as
misguided or impotent. The stories are created to be market successes.
Their primary cultural appeal is their use of violence and the viewer's
vicarious and allegedly safe enjoyment of it. The stories are remarkably
successful in that regard. They invite us to make use of two common
psychological defense mechanisms, each of which helps us avoid
confronting our own fears and negative feelings. We can project our own
violent impulses onto the evil aggressor so we can enjoy watching his
violent acts throughout most of the story.76 But because we identify7
primarily with the hero, we also vicariously experience and enjoy his use
of violence to finally save the day. In a neat narrative package, we can
safely project our own negative violent tendencies onto the antagonist and
then vicariously defeat those frightening tendencies by using "redemptive"
violence against them.
This process of projection and identification is, in fact, a modem
reenactment of an ancient purification ritual - the ritual of the scapegoat.78
In that ritual, the gathered community selects an animal or an individual to
be the scapegoat. 7 9 The community then ritually transfers to the scapegoat
all of the community's evil or negative tendencies, illnesses, and fears.o
Then the group ritually tortures and kills the scapegoat or expels the
scapegoat into the wilderness.8 ' After this catharsis, community life can
return to normal until levels of anxiety and fear become too great and it is
*82
time to enact the ritual again.
Not only do scapegoating rituals serve the psychological function of
managing the community's negative emotions, but they also affect
7 See, e.g., CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER (Paramount Pictures 1994); TAKEN (EuropaCorp.
2008); MISSION IMPOSSIBLE (Paramount Pictures 1996); AIR FORCE ONE (Columbia Pictures 1997).
74See, e.g., the JAMES BOND (Eon Productions 1962) series.
7 Projection is one's conscious denial of having negative feelings or desires by attributing them
to others.
6 We can safely enjoy the negative violence because we know that in the end, the hero will defeat
the aggressor.
7 Identification operates when a person imagines herself as being like another, especially a hero
or leader.
See CHARLIE CAMPBELL, SCAPEGOAT: A HISTORY OF BLAMING OTHER PEOPLE 37-45, 181-85
(2011) ("The ritual of the scapegoat goes back right to the beginning of mankind."); see generally Lynn
Sandra Kahn, The Dynamics of Scapegoating: The Expulsion of Evil, 17 PSYCHOTHERAPY: THEORY,

RES. & PRACT. 79 (1980); THE SCAPEGOAT: RITUAL AND LITERATURE (John B. Vickery & J'nan M.
Sellery, eds., 1972).
79CAMPBELL, supra note 78, at 37-45.
so Kahn, supra note 78, at 79 ("In this context, scapegoating was seen as a response to
deprivation, frustration, and fear which was . . . transferred" on to an animal, another person, or a
group.).
" CAMPBELL, supra note 78, at 37-45.
82Id. The scapegoating ritual was especially used in the aftermath of a disaster. Id. at 39.
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community life in another significant way. The scapegoating ritual
reinforces community boundaries-boundaries that seem necessary to help
us organize and manage a complex world.83 We decide who is in and who
is out. When the ritual is reenacted physically, such as in a sentencing
hearing, community boundaries are reinforced literally. The defendant is
physically excluded or killed.
But a scapegoating ritual defines
community boundaries abstractly as well, whether the ritual is reenacted in
real life or on the big screen. The reality is that in-groups are formed not
so much by admission ceremonies as by exclusion ceremonies.
Participating in a process of excluding someone else establishes a kind of
bond with others who participate in the exclusion. Anyone who has
watched faculty politics for very long will certainly recognize this
phenomenon. Deciding who is not a part of the community is the simplest
and easiest way to decide who is. The more fearful a community is, the
higher it builds its walls and the more it limits its membership. In these
fearful times, modem narrative reenactments of the myth of redemptive
violence provide a seductive opportunity to participate in ongoing
scapegoating rituals and thus to manage communal and individual fear.
But real life is not the same as fiction - or is it? The myth of
redemptive violence is told as fiction, yet its lessons become a means for
the dominant culture to understand the world. Recall these lessons: that we
are always on the brink of destruction by powerful evil forces; that our
only hope is a strong leader who will kill our enemies; that we must not
question this leader and we must not let the law impede him. After many
years of cultural saturation by the myth of redemptive violence-in
movies, television, video games, and books-America's response to the
events of September 11th, 2001 was predictably consistent with the myth's
lessons. A large segment of the population solidified its support for
George W. Bush (a president with the paradigmatic style of a strong
leader); followed him into war in an unrelated country after being told
about threats of "weapons of mass destruction;" and quickly came to view
constitutional protections as impediments to the Nation's safety. 4 This
national response was no accident.
The myth of redemptive violence is one example of the foundational

8 See generally Erich Neumann, The Scapegoat Psychology, THE SCAPEGOAT: RITUAL AND

LITERATURE, supra note 78, at 44-46 (discussing scapegoating as a group purification ritual that
identifies those who are cast as aliens to the group (often racial, religious, or ethnological minorities)
and "exterminated as a foreign body"); CAMPBELL, supra note 78, at 187 ("The scapegoat is the
symbol for the part of us that we most wish to remove and that society fears most at that time [witches,
Jews, Cathars]."); Kahn, supra note 80, at 79 (arguing that scapegoating is a response to group tensions
arising from "internal diversity").
* See generally James N. Schubert et al., A Defining PresidentialMoment: 911 and the Rally
Effect, 23 POL. PSYCHOL. 559 (2002).
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myths that underlie the power of the dominant group .5 It plays a key role
in legal decision-making. Perhaps its most direct effects are felt in
criminal law, sentencing, and death penalty issues, in the legitimization of
"anti-terrorism" initiatives, and in questions about immigration and
undocumented workers. But its fear, its resistance to change, and its
insistence on obedience to those in power become habits of the mind.
Thus, they play a significant role in legal results in other areas as well: for
example, in civil rights and discrimination, where the legal issues invite
drawing boundaries between "us" and "them." It uses fear to resist change
and to justify the power of the dominant group. It rushes to identify both a
victim and an outsider - an evil person or group. It preaches that "our"
community is unraveling, and that law is an impediment to our safety
rather than a tool that protects and liberates us.
IV. YASER ESAM HAMDI, THE FOURTH CIRCUIT, AND THE SUPREME
COURT

The saga of Yaser Esam Hamdi provides a striking example of how the
foundational myth of redemptive violence works to decide legal issues.
Hamdi, an American citizen, was born in Louisiana but later moved with
his parents to Saudi Arabia. It has been reported 6 that at the age of
twenty, before the events of September 11th, he ran away from home to a
Taliban camp, becoming disillusioned within a few weeks. Shortly after
the events of September 1 1 th, he was caught in hostilities and captured by
the Northern Alliance.88 The United States Executive branch kept him
imprisoned for nearly three years, first in Afghanistan, then at Guantanamo
Bay, and eventually in military jails in the United States.8 9 For the first
two years, he was kept in virtual solitary confinement, without charge,
without access to a lawyer, and without any contact from his parents or
other family members. The administration did not disclose its allegations
5 For other examples, see, e.g., LAKOFF, supra note 45 (the metaphor of the stem father and its
role in the law of domestic programs); Edwards, supra note 25, at 914-15 n.267 (the myth of the divine
child and its role in abortion analysis); Linda L. Berger, Of Metaphor, Metonymy, and Corporate

Money: Rhetorical Choices in Supreme Court Decisions on Campaign Finance Regulation, 58
MERCER L. REV. 949, 950, 960 (2007) (the metaphors of corporate personhood); Robert Sapolski, This
is Your Brain on Metaphors,N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2010, 4:32 PM), http://perma.cc/YFJ7-TGVA (the

metaphor of infestation and its role in issues of immigration); see generally, e.g., Carol McCreehan
Parker, The Perfect Storm, the Perfect Culprit: How a Metaphor of Fate Figures in Judicial Opinions,
43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 323 (2012) (discussing the metaphor of the perfect storm);
6 The facts of Hamdi's situation cannot be recited with certainty since the government never
allowed Hamdi to speak for himself.
Tony Bartelme, Hanahan Brig: The Next Guantanamo?, POST & COURIER, (Mar. 22, 2009,
12:01 AM), http://perma.cc/DM9T-QWL9.
" Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510-13 (2004) (according to his father's affidavit, Hamdi
had traveled to Afghanistan prior to the beginning of the hostilities, had been in the country less than
two months to do relief work, and was trapped in the hostilities).
8 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598, 601 (4th Cir. 2002).
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against him, and he had no opportunity to refute them. The government
argued that because the United States was under attack by terrorist forces,
it could keep Hamdi, an American citizen, in this fashion, essentially for as
long as it chose. 90
Hamdi's long, solitary detention and interrogation eventually resulted
in a series of hard-fought legal efforts by others on his behalf The
government argued, for the first time in American jurisprudence, 9' that it
had the power to hold an American citizen incommunicado, subjected to
indefinite detention on American soil "without charges, without any
findings by a military tribunal, and without access to a lawyer." 9 2 The
government argued that the detention was lawful because the Commander
in Chief had classified Hamdi as an "enemy combatant." 93
The
government initially argued that its classification of Hamdi could not be
challenged.94 Thus, the Commander in Chief asserted the power to hold
"any American citizen alleged to be an enemy combatant . . . indefinitely
without charges or counsel on the government's say-so." 95
After being ordered to explain the factual basis for its decision to
classify Hamdi as an enemy combatant, the government submitted one
document: a two-page affidavit by Michael Mobbs, a Defense Department
official.96 In just nine numbered paragraphs, Mobbs declared that he was
familiar with the Hamdi classification from having reviewed the relevant
government records and reports. Based on what he had read in the
government's files, Mobbs asserted that Hamdi had been fighting as part of
the Taliban and that Hamdi had confirmed the government's position
during interrogation.97 The nature of the government's interrogation of
Hamdi was not set forth and the affidavit was almost entirely conclusory
and based on hearsay.
The legal issue was thus ready for debate: Does the Commander in
Chief have the power to detain a U.S. citizen, without access to counsel or
to any due process, based solely on its own unsubstantiated and untested
assertions of the relevant legal conclusion? The District Court held that the
Mobbs affidavit fell "far short of even . . . minimal criteria for judicial

" One week after the events of September 11, Congress passed a resolution authorizing the
President to "use all necessary and appropriate force" against the "nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks." Authorization for Use of
Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
91 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 528 (E.D. Va. 2002).
92id.
93id.
94id.
95id.
96

Id. at 533.

Respondents' Response to, and Motion to Dismiss, the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at
19-20, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Va. 2002).
97
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review," 98 and it ordered the government to produce at least some of the
underlying facts. 99 The government immediately appealed to the Fourth
Circuit, which stayed the order and held that the Mobbs affidavit was
sufficient.'00 The Fourth Circuit held, in a stunning logical fallacy, that it
was "undisputed" that Hamdi (who had yet to see a lawyer or make any
filing in the case) had been present in a zone of active combat, and
therefore Hamdi had no right to dispute the government's allegations.' 0 ' In
other words, the government had prevented Hamdi from disputing the
allegations, and therefore, the government's allegations were undisputed.
Since the allegations were not disputed, Hamdi had no right to dispute
them. According to the Fourth Circuit, the "vital purposes" 02 of the
detention of enemy combatants are "directly derived from the war powers
of Articles I and II"103 and therefore the principles of separation of power
prohibit a court from inquiring further into Hamdi's status.1o4
But beneath all the Constitutional talk about war powers and the
separation of powers, the argument was fundamentally about the choice of
a constitutive myth. Like most cases that reach the Supreme Court on
certiorari, each side had feasible deductive arguments. Each side used the
traditional master's tools - the interpretation of constitutional and statutory
language; analogies and distinctions; policy arguments; even principles of
international law. The Court could have chosen the deductive arguments
of the government and the Fourth Circuit or the deductive arguments of
Hamdi's father and the District Court. At its core, the question was
whether to see the legal issues through the lens of the myth of redemptive
violence or through the lens of the story of the American Revolution and
the founding of the Nation.
The Fourth Circuit was operating within the myth of redemptive
violence, and its opinions are essentially retellings of that myth. The
primary opinion begins by describing the world as an overwhelmingly
dangerous place, under attack by powerful evil forces.' 5 After an opening
paragraph baldly stating its decision, the Fourth Circuit began to explain
and justify its ruling with this language:
[T]he al Qaida terrorist network, utilizing commercial
airliners, launched massive attacks on the United States on
September 11, 2001, successfully striking the World Trade
98

Hamdi, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 533.
Id. at 529.
10 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F. 3d 450, 473 (4th Cir. 2003).
99

'0'Id.
102

at 459, 475.

Id. at 465
"o
Id. at 466.
04
1 Id. at 473.
05

Id. at 459.
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Center in New York City, and the Pentagon, the military
headquarters of our country, near Washington, D.C.... In
total, over 3,000 people were killed on American soil that
day." 06
The opinion next describes the Congressional grant of what the
opinion treats as virtually unlimited authority to respond to this terrorist
attack:
In the wake of this atrocity, Congress authorized the
President "to use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks" or "harbored such organizations or
persons. The President responded by ordering United
States armed forces to Afghanistan to subdue al Qaida and
the governing Taliban regime supporting it." 0 7
The Fourth Circuit opinion goes on to explain that this situation calls
for broad judicial deference to the executive branch, which must not be
compelled to justify its actions. 0 "While the ordinary 2241 proceeding
naturally contemplates the prospect of factual development,"109 in cases
such as this, a judicial inquiry into executive decisions risks conflict with
the President's warmaking powers and may impede the executive's ability
to defend the country's interests. "The military has been charged by
Congress and the executive with winning a war, not prevailing in a
possible court case.""10 The opinion went on to proclaim that court
interference is extraordinarily dangerous: "[T]he implications of the
district court's [order that the government produce evidence] could not be
more serious.""' Judicial review must defer to the President's war
112
powers.
The government need only identify the legal authority upon
which it relies and provide an affidavit of hearsay statements describing
"13
the government's version of the circumstances of the case.
According to the Fourth Circuit, an American citizen in Hamdi's
situation cannot be allowed to rebut the government's factual assertions:
106Hamdi
'0
'os
09

1

v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 459 (4th Cir. 2003).

Id. at 459-60.
Id. at 474.

Id. at 470.

"Id.

niId. at 47 1.
112Hamdi v. Rumsfield, 316 F.3d 450, 471-72 (4th Cir.
2003).
11'Id. at 472-73.
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"We hold that no evidentiary hearing or factual inquiry ...
is necessary or proper, because it is undisputed that Hamdi
was captured in a zone of active combat operations in a
foreign country and because any inquiry must be
circumscribed to avoid encroachment into the military
affairs entrusted to the executive branch."
Thus, the Fourth Circuit saw normative judicial inquiry as worse than
ineffective - it is "extraordinarily dangerous.""'
To defend us, the
executive must be given a virtually free hand. Military decision-making
must not be "saddl[ed] . . . with the panoply of encumbrances"'' 6
represented by a legal inquiry. Efficient, unencumbered violence is the
only way to maintain order and control truly sinister evil.
Further, the Fourth Circuit saw the question as fundamental to defining
and reinforcing community boundaries. Within the myth of redemptive
violence, it is vital to know who is in and who is out. Thus, Hamdi's case
was even more important. Hamdi was an American citizen, but on a
narrative level, the government and the Fourth Circuit rejected that
inconvenient fact. At one point, the government raised a phantom
argument that Hamdi had somehow renounced his citizenship, and the
Fourth Circuit grasped the possibility, saying that Hamdi "may not have
renounced" his citizenship.
Beneath the textual surface of each
controlling opinion of the Fourth Circuit, it is clear that the Court did not
view Hamdi as a "real" American. His official citizenship status was a
mere legal technicality. At no point did the court consider that "real"
American citizens might ever be in danger from unconstrained
governmental power to detain and interrogate a citizen it labeled as an
"enemy combatant.""" Despite his legal status, in the court's narrative
lens, Hamdi was not one of us.
The question of whether Hamdi was really one of us was directly
4

11

Id. at 473.

" Id. at 471.
116Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,

296 F.3d 278, 283-84 (4th Cir. 2002).

" The sentence assumes a more likely scenario in which he did renounce and phrases as mere

speculation the idea that he might not have renounced. As far as one can tell from the record, the
choice to assume his renunciation has no evidentiary support. Id. at 280.
11s Some oppositionist scholarship has made the connection between this approach to antiterrorism litigation and questions of race. See, e.g., Raquel Aldana-Pindell, The 9/11 "National
Security" Cases: Three Principles Guiding Judges' Decision-Making, 81 OR. L. REV. 985, 1032-33
(2002); Bill Ong Hing, Vigilante Racism: The De-Americanization of Immigrant America, 7 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 441, 444 (2002); Thomas W. Joo, Presumed Disloyal: Executive Power, Judicial
Deference, and the Construction of Race Before and After September 11, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 1, 39-41 (2002); Natsu Taylor Saito, Whose Liberty? Whose Security? The USA PATRIOTAct in
the Context of COINTELPRO and the Unlawful Repression of PoliticalDissent, 81 OR. L. REV. 1051,
1125 (2002); Adrien Katherine Wing, Civil Rights in the Post 911 World: Critical Race Praxis,
Coalition Building, and the War on Terrorism, 63 LA. L. REV. 717, 747 (2003).
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related to the legal outcome. For the Fourth Circuit, he was not, and so we
can deny him due process without worrying that next time it will be one of
us." 9 For the Supreme Court plurality, Hamdi was one of us, so we must
accord him all the rights we would grant to any other American citizen.120
For Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, Hamdi was one of us, so we
should do what we do to citizens who (allegedly) take up arms against us:
try him for treason. Who is in and who is out in a narrative sense, not just
a doctrinal sense, matters profoundly.
Ultimately, however, a majority of the Supreme Court saw the story
primarily through the constitutive lens of the hard-won freedoms secured
by the American Revolution and the founding of the Nation. Recognizing
the importance of both narratives, Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion
ultimately is unwilling to sacrifice the freedoms at the core of the founding
of the Nation. She wrote:
Striking the proper constitutional balance here is of great
importance to the Nation during this period of ongoing
combat. But it is equally vital that our calculus not give
short shrift to the values that this country holds dear or to
the privilege that is American citizenship. It is during our
most challenging and uncertain moments that our Nation's
commitment to due process is most severely tested; and it
is in those times that we must preserve our commitment at
home to the principles for which we fight abroad.

. .

. see

also United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967) ("It
would indeed be ironic if, in the name of national defense,
we would sanction the subversion of one of those liberties
. . . which makes the defense of the Nation
worthwhile").121
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, saw the question as less of a
balance between the two narratives. His opinion remains firmly planted
within the constitutional narrative protecting citizens from governmental
abuse of power.122 Compare the beginning of the Fourth Circuit's
opinion with Justice Scalia's setting of narrative context:
The very core of liberty secured by our Anglo-Saxon
system of separated powers has been freedom from
119
120

See Hing, supra note 118, at 444.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004).

121 Id.

at 5 3 2.

12 See infra text accompanying note 124-29.
12 Hamdiv. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d. 450, 459-60 (4th Cir. 2003).
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indefinite imprisonment at the will of the Executive.
Blackstone stated this principle clearly: "Of great
importance to the public is the preservation of this
personal liberty: for if once it were left in the power of
any, the highest, magistrate to imprison arbitrarily
whomever he or his officers thought proper . . . there

would soon be an end of all other rights and immunities . .
."
1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of
England 131-133 (1765).124

Justice Scalia moved immediately to the Founders' adoption of
Blackstone, citing The Federalist No. 84 as the foundation of the
Constitution's Due Process and Suspension Clauses.125 Within the next
two pages, he began to set out the English and American history of the
implementation of these rights, always in the context of the struggle
between governmental power and the people's liberty and, in the
America's story, in the context of "the Founders' general mistrust of
military power permanently at the Executive's disposal." 26 He wrote, "A
view of the Constitution that gives the Executive authority to use military
force rather than the force of law against citizens on American soil flies in
the face of the mistrust that engendered these provisions." 27 He concluded
his opinion by choosing the story of American liberty instead of the myth
of redemptive violence:
The Founders well understood the difficult tradeoff
between safety and freedom.
"Safety from external
danger", Hamilton declared, "is the most powerful director
of national conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will,
after a time, give way to its dictates. The violent
destruction of life and property incident to war; the
continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual
danger, will compel nations the most attached to liberty, to
resort for repose and security to institutions which have a
tendency to destroy their civil and political rights. To be
more safe, they, at length, become willing to run the risk of
being less free." The Federalist No. 8, p. 33. The
Founders warned us about the risk, and equipped us with a
Constitution designed to deal with it. Many think it not
only inevitable but entirely proper that liberty give way to
124Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 554-55.
125Id. at 555-56.
6
12
Id. at 568.
127 Id. at 569.
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security in times of national crisis - that, at the extremes of
military exigency, inter arma silent leges. Whatever the
general merits of the view that war silences law or
modulates its voice, that view has no place in the
interpretation and application of a Constitution designed
precisely to confront war and, in a manner that accords
with democratic principles, to accommodate it.128
The Hamdi case demonstrates how legal outcomes can be dictated not
so much by deductive argument as by the choice of constitutive myth.
Both sides offered traditional legal arguments, but the real battle was
between the story of the Nation's founding, on the one hand, and the story
of redemptive violence on the other. The Fourth Circuit saw the arguments
through the lens of redemptive violence, and thus allowed the myth to play
a key role in legal decision-making.1 29 The majority of the Supreme Court
saw the arguments primarily through the lens of the American story
establishing the liberty and safety of citizens as against an unconstrained
Executive.
Through the myth's foundation of fear, its insistence on obedience to a
powerful leader, and its obsession with defining community boundaries, it
has become a lens through which large portions of the culture view the
world. We must be ready to cross-examine the myth: Does revenge really
heal us? Is law weak and ineffective? Is violence the only effective
answer to human evil? But we cannot cross-examine a myth unless we
recognize it, becoming aware of its fingerprints on the legal decisions of
our day. And we are not likely to recognize the myth and its work if we
pretend that law is limited to the methods of traditional legal argument.
Dialectic engagement, however, is not enough.13 0 As oppositionists claim
and as Hamdi shows, we must be ready to tell counter-stories' 3 that teach
a different set of lessons - lessons about law as a journey toward
wholeness and healing, toward justice and inclusion, toward fulfillment of
America's promise for all her children.

12 Just three months after the Supreme Court ruled that the administration could not detain Hamdi
indefinitely without trial, Hamdi was deported to Saudi Arabia on the condition that he renounce his
U.S. citizenship and give up his claims against the United States over his captivity. Id. at 578-79.

Tony Bartelme, Hanahan Brig: The Next Guantanamo? CHARLESTON POST AND COURER, Mar. 15,

2009 (Hamdi had to agree to comply with strict travel restrictions, including notifying the Saudi
government if he ever plans to leave the kingdom); Joel Brinkley & Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Releases
Saudi-American It Had Capturedin Afghanistan, N.Y. TIEmS, Oct. 12, 2004.
12' As is no doubt clear, I see the issues primarily through the story of the founding of the Nation
and the protection of citizens against unbridled governmental power.
130 See supra text accompanying notes 102-05.
13 To be clear, our counter-stories must stand ready to be cross-examined as well.
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V. IT'S PRECONSTRUCTIONS ALL THE WAY DowN
As laid out in the introduction, this article will elaborate on two of the
arguably controversial premises in the deductive argument. The first was
the idea that traditional legal analysis often does not fully account for legal
results.
Despite articulated reliance on traditionally accepted legal
"reasons," a legal result may have been effectively preordained by widely
accepted mental patterns (schemas) such as myth, metaphor, and other
master stories and cultural scripts. That idea surely does not surprise
readers familiar with any of several literatures, among them, critical
theory, law and rhetoric, law and society, law and the humanities, law and
literature, post-modem or deconstructivist philosophy, or cognitive theory.
For other readers, the sections above have offered a taste of what the
premise might mean and why it might offer a more accurate or more
complete understanding of what often accounts for legal results.
Failing to recognize the hidden foundations of traditional legal analysis
leads to a significant misunderstanding about the role of narrative in law
and therefore a misunderstanding of the relationship between critical
theory and traditional legal analysis. The error is often reflected in
criticisms of storytelling's legitimacy as a form of legal critique. The
argument goes like this: Legal deliberation is rational when it relies on
precedent, statutory language, or policy. But it is emotional, overly
subjective, and unreliable when it relies on stories, so we should reject
stories and choose traditional legal analysis.13 2
Richard Posner's attack on critical race theory set out in the
introduction to this article takes that position. Posner and others like him
believe that critical theory tells oppositional stories in order to pit them
against traditional legal reasoning, such as reliance on authority, analogy,
and policy. Not so. Outsider stories do not oppose the tools of traditional
legal analysis. Rather, outsider stories oppose the dominant group's
hidden foundational master stories - the cultural stories that actually
account for the decision, which is then rationalized and justified by use of
authority, analogy, and policy.'33 As Delgado said in 1989, it's a war
between stones. 34
112See generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1178-80 (1989); FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION
OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 38-52 (1991).
"' See generally Delgado, supra note 22.
134 Notice, for instance, that the question Posner and others attempt to answer - whether
oppositionist critique stands within law or external to it - cannot even be asked without reliance on the
rhetorical study of metaphor. The question assumes the operation of the container schema, which
assumes a boundary, an interior, and an exterior. Metaphorically, we think of ideas as objects, so with
the operation of the container schema and the ideas-as-objects metaphor, we can then ask whether the
object "oppositional critique" is "inside" or "outside" the container "law." Without metaphor and other
preconstructions, we cannot think about, talk about, or decide any abstract question, including the
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The litigation history of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld provides a good example
of the war between stories. The Fourth Circuit governing opinions used
the traditional language of legal analysis (textual interpretation; analogy;
distinction; policy), but these deductive arguments were all made within a
narrative world created by the myth of redemptive violence. That powerful
rhetorical combination - narrative and deduction -- is possible because the
myth of redemptive violence is already encoded in parts of the
Constitution, particularly the Article II War Powers, which assign the
President the role of Commander in Chief and place the exercise of that
war power in "a single hand."' 35

Similarly, the Supreme Court majority

used the same tools of traditional legal analysis, but within a narrative
world of a brave struggle to protect the liberties hard won at our Nation's
founding. The story of liberty does not oppose the deductive arguments of
the Fourth Circuit; rather it opposes the myth of redemptive violence.136
So as early oppositionists knew long ago and cognitive science has
now demonstrated, it's stories, frames, and metaphors all the way down.13 7
And if it's stories and other preconstructions all the way down, then the
choice is not between oppositional stories and "reasoned argumentation,"
as Posner seems to think. Rather, the choice is whether to admit that
"reasoned argumentation" is built upon the foundation of identifiable and
well-rehearsed preconstructions. In the hands of the dominant group, those
preconstructions maintain existing power and position, so there is a lot at
stake for the dominant group here. Admitting the existence of these
foundational stories would subject those stories to critique and require
justification of the assumption that they are somehow more legitimate or
more accurate than other stories. That is a battle the dominant group
would find hard to win, so it is no wonder that voices such as Posner's
want to separate narrative from law.
VI. CHOOSING A DEFINITION FOR "LAW"

The idea that traditional legal analysis often does not fully account for
legal results gets us only so far, because in Step Three, the deductive
outcome of a particular legal case or our understanding and critique of the law itself. Id. at 2418; see
generally Mark L. Johnson, Mind, Metaphor, and Law, 58 MERCER L. REV. 845 (2006); GEORGE
LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980).
1 "Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands
those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand." Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 542
U.S. 507, 581 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Alexander J. Hamilton, The Federalist No. 74, at 500
(J.Cooke ed. 1961)).
116 In this context, we must quibble with Robert Cover just a bit. For every constitution, there are

multiple epics. But see Cover, supra note 30; L. H. LARUE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AS FICTION:
NARRATIVE IN THE RHETORIC OF AUTHORITY (1995).
1 See Nancy Levit, Reshaping the NarrativeDebate, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 751, 755 (2011);

Joseph William Singer, RadicalModeration, 1985 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 329, 329-30 (1985).
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argument comes down to simple human choice. As we have seen above,
narrative theory and cognitive science can answer the objection to Step
Two's thesis that cultural frames underlie and account for legal outcomes.
But Step Three's thesis - that "law" includes those largely unarticulated
frames - depends on the definitions we choose. As metaphor theory
teaches us, the criteria that determine status within or outside a category
are not preordained. 3 8 They are the product of the values and interests of
whichever discourse community dominates the conversation. 3 9 We could
choose to define law narrowly, including only the reasons traditional legal
discourse will admit or only those that affect law more than they affect
other parts of our lives (if such a category exists). If we do, then my
argument fails, but only because we have decided that we want it to fail
and so have defined our terms accordingly.
So back to the matter of choice: since law's definition is a discoursal
question - a question defined by the relevant discourse community - law's
definition comes down to a matter of power, and we should consider the
implications of the choice to define "law" broadly or narrowly. Traditional
definitions of law are narrow, privileging what Goodrich calls "the
grammatical or logical decoding of the text,"o4 0 and thus conclude that
oppositionists stand outside law. 1 But the choice to exclude the prophets
prevents traditionalists from hearing important voices and important
messages. It effectively precludes any real hope for understanding
oppositionists' perspectives and for developing a broader view of legal
possibilities.
To return to this article's beginning, oppositionists, in a way
comparable to a psychoanalyst looking for what lies beneath an explicit
behavior, try to look deeper to ask what is really going on.142 Will We
allow such questions to be asked inside the wall? Law is clearly the
product of argument. Traditional law-talk, conducted in rationalist,
objectivist language, is half of an argument. Oppositionist critique is the
other half For law to progress, we need both sides of the argument inside
the wall.
What about the prophets? Should they agree to stay outside the city
walls? When there is a choice to be made, critical theory wonders which
option benefits which group. It is easy to see why traditionalists would
prefer the narrow definition of "law," placing critical theory outside the
wall. Traditional legal analysis relies primarily on existing legal texts. A
m See Johnson, supra note 134.
139id.
140

Goodrich, supra note 11, at 206.

141 See,

e.g., Posner,supra note 3; Heather MacDonald, Rule ofLaw: Law School Humbug, WALL

ST. J., Nov. 8, 1995, at A21 (describing feminist jurisprudence and critical race theory as "antithetical
to the very notion of law").
142 See supra text accompanying notes
22-30.

70

CONNECTICUT PUBLIC INTEREST LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 13:1

narrow view of law shields from challenge the preconstructions that have
produced those existing legal texts as well as authoritative interpretations
of them. Thus, this self-protective viewl43 allows the products of existing
power structures to appear neutral, objective, logical, and even quasiscientific. It is a short step from that definition of law to the conclusion
that oppositional storytelling is an illegitimate method of legal critique
because it is not legal critique at all. The narrow definition devalues
oppositional scholarship and legitimates traditional power structures within
both the academy and law practice.
A broad definition, however - a definition that includes everyone 's
preconstructions - can have a leveling effect for groups with less power.
Each set of preconstructions becomes subject to identification and critique,
so any legal question can be evaluated more completely and with less blind
adherence to the values and interests of the dominant group. Thus, this
definitional question is more than just a matter of theory; it has important
real world implications.
Dominant foundational narratives will not
succumb to simple dialectical critique. Early oppositionists knew this. For
example, Goodrich does not hold out much hope for merely pointing out
that the emperor's rules and standards have no clothes. He observes that
an ideology is a collective practice and a mode of belonging, and that this
mode of belonging is its most enduring feature. 44 Thus, direct, express
critique of ideology is inadequate. For this, he quotes R. Debray:
"Specialists have torn all the ideological systems to shreds, laid bare all the
shameful messianisms and exposed all the nonsense to pitiless ridicule yet 'ideology' buries its philosophical gravediggers one after the other,",4 1
and F. Nietzsche, The Dawn of Day, aphorism 444 (London: Allen &
Unwin 1903):
Surprise at resistance: Because we see through a thing we

think that in future it will be unable to offer us any
resistance whatsoever - and we are surprised at finding
that we are able to see through it, and yet unable to run
through it. This foolish sensation and surprise are similar
to the sensation which a fly experiences before a window
146
pane.
Recent work in cognitive theory has substantiated this early
oppositionist intuition. It turns out that rational argument does little to
143 As strategies of self-protection, Goodrich points to the doctrines
of unity, coherence, and
univocality. Goodrich, supra note 11, at 205.
44
1 Id. at 209.
145id.
46
1 Id. at 205.
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change attitudes based on opposing preconstructions. In fact, there is
evidence that confronting a decision-maker with rational counterargument
(facts, policies, and principles that push against the decision-maker's
preexisting leanings, which we have already learned are likely to be the
result of preconstructions) 4 7 actually prompts that decision-maker to
generate competing arguments and further solidifies preexisting views.
Some fascinating recent work has shown that if an advocate's traditional
merits arguments (facts, analogies, deductions) conflict with the decisionmaker's preexisting values, the decision-maker is prompted to "protect"
her preexisting values by generating counterarguments to oppose the
advocate's traditional merits arguments. But if the advocate offers a
"value-involved" argument, '4 such as stories, metaphors, and other
frames, the decision-maker is more likely to be open to changing her mind
and less likely to generate merits arguments to resist the advocate's
position. As Kathryn Stanchi has written:
This means that in value-protective situations, stronger
arguments in the persuasive message will not lead to
attitude change, and may make the belief of the message
recipient more entrenched. Rather, to induce attitude
change in someone who has strongly held beliefs, the peripheral-not central-route 4 9 is the more effective means
... In other words, if a person has strong values and the
advocate's desired result conflicts with those values, merits
arguments are not likely to wield great influence,
regardless of their strength. The opposite occurs for a
value-involved message recipient when the message
confirms her beliefs ("value-affirmative processing"). In
that situation, strong merits arguments will influence the
message recipient by making more secure the beliefs
consistent with the message.15o
This cognitive finding is consistent with oppositionists' experience:
even when the tools of traditional legal analysis provide feasible legal
arguments on behalf of less powerful groups, those arguments are not
enough. They often will not be effective unless they can be accompanied
See supra text accompanying note 36.
Cognitive theory uses the term "value-relevant involved" to refer to decision-makers who
approach an issue with preexisting views and values. Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Science of Persuasion:
An Initial Exploration, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REv. 411, 440-42 (2006).
149 The cognitive studies choice of language is unfortunate in the sense that,
without any research
justifying a preference, the language inherently privileges what it calls "central" processing at the
expense of what it calls "peripheral" processing.
15o Stanchi, supra note 148, at 441-42.
147
148
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by exposure to a different narrative frame.
So in Hamdi's case, it turns out that both the government and the
Fourth Circuit's reliance on parsing authoritative text and drawing
analogies and distinctions may not have had the desired effect on Supreme
Court Justices who were inclined to approach the Hamdi issues from the
values of liberty and the story of the Nation's founding. In fact, the use of
the traditional master's tools may have had the opposite effect, prompting
the generation of counterarguments. Similar sorts of traditional arguments
made by Hamdi's father's lawyers and the District Court may have had
little effect or even a negative effect on the Fourth Circuit and on Justice
Clarence Thomas, who saw the case through the lens of the myth of
redemptive violence. Even a quick reading of the four opinions (the
plurality, the concurrence, and the two dissents) demonstrates the backand-forth among the Justices in which they respond to each other's
traditional arguments by generating traditional counterarguments.
Therefore, establishing storytelling as a legitimate form of legal
advocacy is more than a nice question of theory. Legal outcomes depend
upon it. Audre Lorde was right: "[T]he master's tools will never
dismantle the master's house. They may allow us temporarily to beat him
at his own game, but they will never enable us to bring about genuine
change."
What matters most may be story, metaphor, and other valueladen frames.
The question of whether critical theory is within or outside of law
depends on the definition of "law." Either a broad definition or a narrow
definition is rationally justifiable. The definition is in the control of the
relevant discourse community, and it will reflect the values and interests of
that particular community. In law, inclusion in that discourse community
is contested. Many traditionalists seem to believe that the assumed values
of the dominant cultural group-which are benefitted by a narrow
definition of law-should control. 5 2 Oppositionists who want to challenge
that hegemony should argue for a broad definition of law, finding room
within it for the values and interests of less powerful groups.
VII. CONCLUSION

This essay began by suggesting a short set of propositions about law:
(1) that law includes both the outcomes of legal questions and the
traditional law talk that claims to explain those outcomes; (2) that often
this traditional law talk is primarily justification and that legal results are
more accurately described as the product of preconstructions such as myths
15 Lorde, supra note
152

17, at 112.

See generally Scalia, supra note 132; Carrington, supra note 7; MacDonald, supra note 141;

Posner, supra note 3; SCHAUER, supra note 132.
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and master stories; (3) that if law includes the reasons that claim to account
for legal results (but often do not), it surely should include law's
preconstructions, which may be the actual reasons for legal results; and (4)
that if narrative and other preconstructions are part of law when they
account for legal results consistent with the power of the dominant group
(step three), they surely are also part of law when used by oppositionists to
critique those same results. In short, stories and other frames are
everybody's tools and therefore oppositional stories and frames should be
considered within law, not external to it.
These premises may provide a simple rational argument for including
critical theory within law, but that argument does not resolve the question.
The rational argument can be contested with other rational arguments, such
as skepticism about the role of preconstructions or rejection of a definition
that might include everything and therefore define nothing. Such rational
arguments about theory could go on endlessly and probably will, because
what is at stake is power.
Truth be told, the theoretical question of how we choose to define law
is less important than how well we can oppose injustice. The scholarship
of critical theory has done excellent work in telling the stories of
outsiders.'5 3 That scholarship is essential oppositional work because
outsider stories have often been unheard in the halls of power. But we
must do more to connect these oppositional stories to their own
mythogenic and metaphorical roots ' 4 in order to teach progressive
advocates how to become better oppositional storytellers. We must also
unmask and deconstruct the foundational myths and metaphors assumed
and masterfully employed to maintain existing power.
One of the primary differences between the Right and the Left is the
starkly different set of constitutive myths and metaphors each uses to
structure the world in which particular legal questions arise. The question
for each of us, including for judges, is which set of myths we will choose
to live within. We can call them law, or not, but that's where the real
action is.

' See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, CriticalRace Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 79
VA. L. REV. 461, 462 (1993) ("Many Critical Race theorists consider that a principal obstacle to racial
reform is majoritarian mindset - the bundle of presuppositions, received wisdoms, and shared cultural
understandings persons in the dominant group bring to discussions of race. To analyze and challenge
these power-laden beliefs, some writers employ counterstories, parables, chronicles, and anecdotes
aimed at revealing their contingency, cruelty, and self-serving nature.").
154See generally LINDA H. EDWARDS, READINGS IN PERSUASION: BRIEFS THAT CHANGED THE
WORLD (2012); Edwards, supra note 25; Ruth Anne Robbins, Harry Potter,Ruby Slippers andMerlin:

Telling the Client's Story Using the Characters and Paradigm of the Archetypal Hero's Journey, 29
SEATTLE U. L. REv. 767 (2006); see generally Pamela Wilkins, Confronting the Invisible Witness: The
Use ofNarrative to Neutralize CapitalJurors' Implicit Racial Biases, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 305 (2012).

